Is the world unipolar, multipolar, or nonpolar? It depends whom you ask. But apparently, it may depend even more on where you ask, for national perspectives determine more than anything the lens through which analysts of international relations view and interpret the world.

Many Europeans, for example, tend to believe the world is multipolar, which implies the faint hope that Europe is, in fact, one of the poles. This changes considerably outside of Europe, where the EU is largely seen as an economic block, but not as a serious actor with one voice. Despite a an apparent genetic predisposition for eternal optimism, American analysts of international relations traditionally see the United States in decline, identifying to the next best player as the rising pole.  During the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union, in the 1980s it was Japan, and now, of course, China, where,  interestingly enough, many people still regard the world as unipolar and under US rule (a notion that is largely passé in the US). This may be tactics. Describing the world as unipolar, and America as the hegemon, frees China of the evermore pressing question of how China plans to run the show once it is the largest economy in the world – a moment that will arrive, depending on the forecast, between 2025 and 2040.

By that time, however, other players such as India and Brazil plan on playing in the first league (and they are quite likely to do so), so analystst from these two rising powers located on the fringes of the ‘Greater West’ usually describe the world as moving into a multipolar era, regarding themselves as a pole. Brazil’s foreign minister Celso Armorim prefers to identify South America or Latin America as one of the poles of this new multipolarity, but the only half-serious talk to regional integration cannot hide his country’s fledgling power ambitions. Yes, the region is important, but Brazil prefers to have the permanent seat on the UN Security Council for itself, and rather not share it Argentina on a rotating principle.

India is more direct, and, as a European diplomat who prefers to remain anonymous recently muttered, as cocky as a future global power could be. India can afford to be patient because it believes to have time on its side. Decades of isolation did little to change its mind and give up its nuclear ambitions. In 2006, when President Bush unilaterally recognized India as a nuclear power, India’s confidence got a boost. Why would America, the world’s leading power honor a pariah that, located in one of the most dangerous regions of the planet, refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), if it did not exepct India to emerge as a major pole in the near future? Indian thinkers seem less excited about the tectonic power shifts than people elsewhere, because they interpret India’s rise as it’s rightful and inevitable return to power after a brief interlude of Western domination (similar to China).

Last and least, Russia’s thinkers regard Russia as a pole, yet they largely admit that Russia fails to articulate any vision of how the world should be organized outside of what it claims to be its dominion. While the definition of what constitutes a pole remains controversial, virtually all analystst agree that only those powers constitute poles that have significant influence outside of its borders. From this perspective, China is already a pole, and India and Brazil are soon-to-be poles.  Brazil’s stance on the squabble about Iran’s nuclear ambition is sophisticated indeed, if not brilliant. But that still does not amount to a vision of how the world should be run. In a similar fashion, Indian government officials keep things at the general level. Its reluctance to promote democracy and its devout adherence to Westphalian principles  give a vague idea of how a world led by the likes of India. In a similar fashion, Chinese officials often have surprisingly little to say about how Beijing hopes to run the planet- but then, China sees little need to unnecessarily cause alarm. China’s time will come, and rather than making big statements, Chinese officials prefer to lean back and watch a America becomes ever more nervous.

The relatively recent idea that the world is increasingly non-polar, justified, among other issues, by the rise of non-state actors (Taliban, Gates Foundation, Google,  CNN, etc.), subnational actors (California, São Paulo)  has gained quite some backing in Western circles. It is true that the rise of non-state actors is important, but it is not entirely new. The East India Company, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and religious outfits of all kinds are examples of powerful non-state actors that have existed in the past. The Taliban may be a non-state actor, but once NATO leaves Afghanistan, it is likely to turn into a state actor. Non-polarity sounds interesting, but it is unlikely to become the accepted norms in India and China, where analysts largely think in terms of state power.

Is there a chance for consensus? For Americans, the unipolar moment is a thing of the past. Others aren’t so sure yet. Despite the non-polar fad, thinkers may increasingly disaggregate dimensions of power, distinguishing between military unipolarity (the US military is almost as powerful as all the others combined) and ecnonomic multipolarity- a description that is likely to best capture reality for the decades to come.

As the world finds itself in transition from a unipolar, US-dominated system to a multipolar structure with several poles, there is a widespread assumption that international organizations, or “global governance”, is crucial for this transition and its aftermath to take place in a peaceful manner. Countless IR analysts therefore spend their days studying ways to make global governance more effective. Many roposals emerge every year to reform the UN Security Council, to expand NATO, and to “democratize” the World Bank and the IMF, always assuming that effective global governance will make the world more stable. The fact that two rising giants, China and India, are located in an area largely void of international institutions, creates even more urgency to strengthen global governance and somehow integrate them. Yet, is this assumption correct? While global governance institutions may intuitively seem like an agent for peace,  what is the logic behind it?

Realists and the fallacy of institutions

Realists, who think of the world as an anarchic place, do not necessarily dislike global governance. Yet, they regard its impact as limited, as international institutions are, according to them, a dependent reflection of the participating states’ power and thus unable to alter a state’s behavior. The independent variable that explains war and peace are not institutions, but balance of power. The most powerful states in a system create and shape international institutions, which are then primarily used to “act out” these power relationships. States may build alliances and decide to cooperate, but they will change their strategy when it seems convenient. Today’s friend, after all, may be tomorrow’s enemy. Finally, in a realist world, states are obsessed with relative-gains logic, and they only cooperate if they benefit more than the other side, which makes long-term cooperation difficult. Institutions, in short, do not make the world a more peaceful place.

Liberal institutionalists’ beloved institutions

Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, argue that institutions do in fact cause stability and peace among nations. While they agree that nations would cheat if it went unpunished, they stress that institutions create a powerful mechanism that convinces nations to opt for long-term cooperation rather than focusing on short-term gain and cheating the other. The effectiveness of an institutions can thus be measured in its ability to coerce its members to cooperate and refrain to misbehaving. Contrary to what realists’ believe, institutions thus become an independent factor that can impact state behavior, which is not just a mere reflection of their power. While the underlying assumption remains the same (states want to maximize power), the institutions (i.e. the rules that make up the institution) alter the way states aim to maximize their power, because the cost of cheating becomes to high- in both the economic and the security realm.  The so-called “shadow of the future”, “issue-linkage”, effective monitoring thanks so technology and reduced transaction costs make cooperation an attractive option for most states. According to liberal institutionalists, relative-gains logic is not as important as realists claim. Also, institutions may successfully address issues of distributive justice.

Whether relative-gains considerations matter or not is a tricky question. They certainly exist, as human beings (and states) naturally compare themselves to others, but the real question is in how far it influences state behavior. Realists say it is very important, liberalists argue that it is secondary once the cheating problem is solved and institutions enjoy the states’ trust.

Collective security theory uses a related approach, envisioning a world in which aggressors are confronted automatically by the international community. Modern-day Wilsonians such as Kofi Annan argue that states must not consider their national interest, but equate it to the wider interest of the global community. The first Gulf War, or the Yugoslav War are examples for such behavior, but they were not the product of international institutions, and collective security remains a normative concept.

So do international institutions influence states’ behavior? A peek into the real world shows that both realists and liberalists have a point. Some institutions, such as the UN Security Council, is an obvious reflection of power in the post-WWII era. And in 2003, the Council was not able to prevent the United States from invading Iraq. Other institutions, such as the European Union, strongly affect the behavior of even the most powerful European states, such as Germany. UN peacekeeping operations have arguably had some stabilizing effect, although its record is mixed, and it is wholly unsuitable for conflict between great powers.

Realists argue that what is really needed to show that liberal institutionalists  have a point are historical cases of cooperation between states that promoted stability and that would not have occurred without the existence of international institutions. Yet, institutions may prevent conflict from emerging in the first place, so it is hard to tell when exactly they have prevented stability. The European Union has brought its members much closer together over the past decades, and there is little doubt that it had a stabilizing force, although it is difficult to prove this empirically. However, the mere fact that the creation of the European Community (EC, later renamed EU) was followed by the most peaceful era in Europe’s history is unlikely to be coincidental. The same is true for the UN Security Council. Since its creation, there has not been any direct large-scale armed conflict between its members. This, however, could also be explained by the arrival of the nuclear age, which made wars between big powers unlikely. Finally, there is a myriad of regulatory interconnections, which make up the less visible of global governance. They help faciliate communication and trade between states, and they certainly increase the barriers –both domestic and international– to go to war.

International institutions are thus very likely to make war less likely.  While we cannot say for sure to what extent international institutions affect international relations, they are, by far, the most promising element in our efforts to promote peace and stability.

Political summits are an intricate business. Usually, they produce completely watered-down statements so bland that if read out loud, they’d put even the most engaged audience to sleep- or they are so removed from reality that they have a surreal ring to it. Some argue that the important stuff happens behind closed doors, when deals are struck and disputes are solved over a glass of fine scotch.  Yet, despite the potential fringe benefits, last week’s summit of Latin American and Caribbean leaders in Mexico, where leaders of all colors pledged to unite under the newly formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac), proved to be yet another festival of collective self-delusion and hollow rhetoric so blatant that the only question the observer was left behind with was  “Who exactly are they trying to fool?” Integration of any kind in Latin America remains as improbable as ever, and yet another addition to the already absurd alphabet soup of regional bodies is unlikely to make a difference.

Talk of unity is insincere, and there are five main reasons why economic or political integration in Latin America will remain an illusion, and why attempts to replace the Organization of American States (OAS) with a newly formed body –which excludes the United States and Canada– is unlikely to help tackle the region’s problems.

First, the region’s governments’ ideological predispositions are too far apart to find a common denominator on any economic, let alone political, issues. Even human rights- an issue often used to create some kind of common ground– is off the table, as Fidel Castro and an increasingly dictatorial Hugo Chavez refuse to discuss a problem highlighted by the death of Orlando Zapata, Cuba’s foremost dissident and defender of human rights, after a hunger strike in prison. But even less emotional issues such as trade liberalization or monetary policy prove difficult as the region’s governments move into opposite directions. The Venezuelan government nationalizes and becomes more fragile, while Brazil, a beacon of monetary stability,  is boasting an economy ever more competitive in virtually all areas. A related problem is the triumph of populist ideology over pragmatism in a series of countries in the region. Blaming outsiders – a daily practice in Venezuela and a phenomenon ever more common in Argentina– is usually a reliable indicator that a government is unwilling or unable to face unwelcome realities. Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Colombia, on the other hand, have reached political maturity and a general policy consensus that allows governments to deal with challenges pragmatically. As a consequence, nations lack the mutual trust necessary to integrate and confer sovereignty to a supranational decision-making body. Mercosur’s lack to establish a permanent supranational entity to decide trade disputes between its members is a case in point.

Secondly, it is increasingly unclear whether the region’s giant, Brazil, is as interested in integration as it claims to be. While Itamaraty, the foreign ministry, is correct to point out that Latin America one of Brazil’s foreign policy priorities, few top policy makers seem inclined to make concessions to neighbors that are falling behind. High-flying Brazil, which is now usually commonly included into all high-profile platforms, has its eyes on a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and has long started to think in more global dimensions. Aside from Brazil’s diverging political ambitions, the lack of mutual economic necessity, an essential ingredient of integration, further reduces incentives to integrate. The EU works because its members depend on each other. Brazil, on the contrary, does not depend on its neighbors. Some analysts even claim that Mercosur’s customs union hurts Brazil’s economy, reducing its room for maneuver when signing trade deals with other big powers. In any case, Brazil is unwilling to bear become the paymaster of integration, a role Germany has played in Europe.

Third, contrary to the European Union, regional integration in South America is a top down initiative that has never enjoyed civil society’s support. There are very few pro-integration pressure groups. In some societies, nationalism is quite strong and there is a potential for resistance against giving up autonomy. Politicians are thus unlikely to
continuously exercise leadership in this matter and push for integration. Contrary to Europeans, who have witnessed the ugly consequences of nationalism and whose societies bear post-modernist characteristics, Latin American nations are, similar to the United States, cherish sovereignty. Despite cultural similarities, most Latin Americans would find it absurd to see a regional parliament in Quito or Caracas overrule a decision their national government has taken.

Fourth, the region’s other significant actor, Mexico, is so much aligned with North America that the term “Latin America” has become largely irrelevant. Felipe Calderón’s pro-Latin America rhetoric during the summit can be read as a meek attempt to restore Mexico’s influence in a region it has long abandoned and left to Brazilian and Venezuelan leadership. Mexico is unlikely to engage in any regional club that positions itself against the United States.

Finally, there are few pragmatic arguments for replacing the OAS with an organization that excludes the United States and Canada, including Cuba instead. In February, Obama rightly pointed out that after criticizing the United States for intervening excessively in the region, several governments are now criticizing the US for having abandoned the region. Heeding to anti-American ideology is unlikely to help deal with problems the Americas urgently need to solve, and despite its occasional arrogance, its inclusion it crucial. Drug-related violence is a case in point, as it involved both Latin and North America. Unless they both sit down together, solutions are likely to be half-baked. In additional, another serious body is unlikely to go down well politically. Most Latin American countries are falling behind with their annual OAS fees, and they are unlikely to agree to paying to finance yet another headquarters, staff and costly summits.

For the time being, Latin America’s leaders can be expected to continue to dream about fulfilling Bolivar’s dream of uniting Latin America. Latin Americans could barely care less. Few Brazilians know that Unasur, another regional body created last year, exists in the first place, and even fewer will know about the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Strengthening the already existing OAS may be a smarter way to go forward.

When Dilma Rousseff was chosen as the Workers’ Party’s candidate for this year’s presidential elections during the party’s congregation yesterday, few were surprised. Lula has been explicit about his anointed successor for a long time. For months, Ms. Rousseff, Lula’s chief of staff, who is commonly called Dilma (pronounced “Djilma”), has been on his side, inaugurating public works, shaking supporters’ hands, and regularly appearing in Brazil’s media. In March 2009, when Lula visited the United States, Dilma met Barack Obama, who promptly asked his campaign strategists to reject a request by Brazil’s Social Democrats (PSDB) and to advise Dilma’s campaign instead. Those who have worked with Ms. Rousseff describe her as “tough”, “pragmatic” and “competent”. Her hot temper is legendary, and Sergio Gabrielli, the boss of Petrobras, Brazil’s oil giant, is said to have broken down in tears once after being reprimanded by her during her time as Energy Minister.

Yet who is Dilma, the first woman to take a serious shot at the presidency in Latin America’s largest and most important country, and what can Brazil and the world expect of her? Born in 1947 into a well-to-do family in Belo Horizonte, Brazil’s version of Pittsburgh, Dilma received a top-notch education. Yet, since Dilma’s father was a Bulgarian immigrant, the Rousseff family was never part of the establishment. At the age of 20, Dilma engaged in one of the countless leftist student organizations created as a reaction to the military coup in 1964- similar to José Serra, her likely opponent in the presidential race. Ms. Rousseff, however, was more radical, helped coordenate armed operations, administered money obtained from bank raids, and was captured in 1970, tortured for 22 days, and released only 2 years later.

Despite this horrific experience, Rousseff returned to politics, this time within the legal framework. After graduating from university with an economics degree, she advised state politicians and, aged 38, shortly before the end of the military dictatorship, became Secretary of Finance in Porto Alegre, a large city in the South. Always known for her pragmatic hands-on approach, she developed the reputation of a skilled technocrat, and in 2001, then-presidential candidate Lula named her junior advisor on energy issues. Surrounded by leftist ideologists, Lula soon identified her as a no-nonsense problem solver who, at times in a highly undiplomatic fashion, never backed away from confrontations. As Energy Minister, Rousseff worked hard to avoid a blackout similar to that at the end of President Cardoso’s term. With interests squarely opposed to those of Marina Silva, then Minister of the Environment, she convinced Lula to prioritize the need for energy over environmental concerns, which eventually led to the departure of Silva, who now runs against Rousseff as the Green Party’s presidential candidate.

When asked about her rough demeanor, Ms. Rousseff retorts that women still face prejudice in Brazilian politics. “When women are in a position of authority”, she explains, “they are always called overly hard and cold.” If she were a man, the single mother of one daughter claims, her style would not be an issue.

After the corruption scandal in 2005 flushed out the upper echelons of the Workers’ Party (PT) and almost brought down the President himself, Rousseff became chief of staff and proved to be crucial to steer the government through hard times. As early as 2007, rumours spread that Lula had chosen her to succeed him, but he did not openly speak of her as a potential candidate until 2008. Rousseff underwent a chemotherapy in 2009 to treat a lymphoma, but her doctors said she had fully recovered only 5 months later, and her health is not expected to be a problem as the prepares to run for the country’s highest office.

While the campaign does not officially start until June, her strategy seems clear:  Ms. Rousseff represents the continuation of the Lula government. The Workers’ Party’s strategy will thus be to frame the election as a referendum on President Lula, which, with a 80% approval rating, she may very well win if Lula is able to transfer his popularity on his protégé. That is easier said than done. Lula is folksy, charming and a brilliant public speaker. Dilma, on the other hand, comes across as rather cold, and while voters are unlikely to find her unappealing, she can in no way match Lula’s star power. Still, her ratings have steadily increased, although she still lags José Serra, who has not started campaigning at all. Despite opponents’ attempts to portray her as a radical bomb-throwing militant, her militancy is unlikey to negatively affect her campaign. The decision not to retreat after being tortured shows, if anything, her passion for politics.

What would a President Rousseff mean for Brazil and the world? Most likely, more of the same. She is less populist and more pragmatic than Lula, and contrary to many in her party, she is aware of the importance honoring contracts, courting investors and allowing private enterprise to flourish.  While critics expect Lula to pull the strings in the background if she became President, they most likely underestimate Ms. Rousseff’s ability to claim power. In this aspect, she may very much resemble Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, whose leadership ability had also been grossly undestimated before she took office. Despite her leadership abilities, party ideology may become a hindrance during her presidency. She may face insurmountable political obstacles that keep her from cutting government spending, reforming social security, modernizing labor and tax law, which sum up Brazil’s most urgent problems that keep it from growing as fast as China and India. Yet, similar to Uruguay and Chile, Brazil’s political system is so mature that no candidate can truly rock the boat, and even a mediocre President is unlikely to get Brazil’s growth story off track.

With regards to foreign policy, Rousseff will see herself forced to continue Lula’s hyperactive foreign policy, although she can impossibly fill her predecessor’s shoes, who has become the darling of leaders across the globe. Brazil’s South-South diplomacy, while unlikely to benefit Brazil, is likely to continue on ideological grounds. Brazil’s foreign policy is currently highly personalized, and it is unclear whether a technocrat like Rousseff will be able to continue Lula’s approach. Dilma is unlikely to bring fresh ideas to the table, and Brazil will continue to be on cozy terms with Iran and Venezuela. It is also likely to continue an ill-defined regional foreign policy that leaves its neighbors in the dark about Brazil’s intentions.

The coming weeks and months will give us a better clue on what to expect of Ms. Rousseff. Lula’s support will be crucial, but she will have to emerge eventually and expose herself to Brazil’s voters and the media. While she can safely assume to win in the poor Northeast, a region where Lula is considered a saint, she will have to explain to middle-class voters in the populous Southeast how she pretends to push urgently needed reforms with a party behind her that, despite the triumph of pragmatism during the Lula years, at times seems dangersously wedged to ideology.

Despite a large-scale marketing campaign prior to its launch, ticket discounts, and a sophisticated strategy to show the movie from trucks in areas where there are no cinemas, the much awaited film “Lula, the son of Brazil”, a biography of the country’s popular President, turned out to be a flop.

Only five weeks after its debut, the movie was no longer among the ten most popular movies in Brazil. Now, seven weeks after its launch, it has disappeared entirely from the screen. Interestingly enough, it seems that the movie’s failure can largely be explained not by its lack of quality –quite to the contrary, it is excellent– but by what Brazilians seemed to regard as an inappropriate attempt to influence the upcoming presidential election. While Lula is barred from running for a third term, he vigorously campaigns for his anointed successor and chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff.

Launching a movie on his life during a campaign Lula is heavily involved in smacks of political manipulation, especially given the fact that several companies who financed the movie have won or hope to win government contracts. It is particularly unfortunate that the movie leaves out all of Lula’s flaws, making him look like a modern Gandhi. Critics thus squarely rejected the movie as propaganda the moment it hit the box offices, something that strongly reverberated with the country’s upper and middle classes. The film, which starts with Lula’s birth in the poor Northeast and ends with Lula’s mother’s death as he was about to enter politics, would probably have received a warmer reception had it been released after the election.

The movie’s lackluster performance at the box offices reaffirms, if anything, the growing political education of Brazil’s masses. If it was the director’s aim to influence the election, his failure shows that Brazilians know to differentiate between a romantic movie and political realities. Many will vote for Dilma because Lula tells them so, but she will have to convince the people that she is strong enough to carry on his politics. Contrary to what she had hoped, the movie will not give her the boost in the opinion polls she needs to get ahead of her rival, José Serra.

This cannot change the fact that Lula’s life story is, by any standard, nothing short of remarkable, and despite the movie’s omissions -for example, Lula’s favorite booze, liquor, was changed to beer, and the movie wrongly shows him disapproving of the  violence his workers’ movement employed- it successfully tells the tale of one of the most impressive political leaders of our time.

Celso Amorim

As Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad annouced to the world that his country would step up its uranium production, the response by the established Western powers was predictable.  Alarm, condemnation and the call for tougher economic sanctions followed swiftly.  Benjamin Netanjahu, Israel’s prime minister, called for “crippling sanctions” against Tehran. While the US, the UK, France and even Russia seem to agree with Israel, Brazil, which holds a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, represents an opposing vision. Why does Brazil defend an unorthodox position in an area that does not seem to concern its national interest?

When Brazil, after decades of disappointment, finally set out to become a global player towards the end of the 20th century, analysts asked whether Brazil would join the liberal West and align with the major international institutions, or whether it would assume a third-worldish, confrontational posture, creating some kind of “anti-Imperialist” club. Yet, Brazil’s foreign policy strategy shows that Brazil wants to be neither one nor the other. Brazil certainly does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons- at the same time, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made clear that he does neither believe in isolating Iran, nor in the utility of sanctions. Amorim’s comments on Iran symbolize, more than anything, Brazil’s “fringe-strategy” in action. As the country rises, it aims to remain on the fringes of the liberal Western core countries to maximize its strategic gains. This entails aligning with the West on some issues, such as international finance, and opposing it on others. Its foreign policy makers believe that Brazil will be strongest by straddling both worlds. As a consequence, there is some risk that others will accuse Brazil of flip-flopping.  While Brazil is set to gain more voting power in the IMF and the World Bank, tangible foreign policy success has been illusive. Still, the strategy could work, and Brazil could serve as a mediator between the West and the non-West- precisely what it currently tries to do with Iran.

Yet, while until recently Iran was seen in Brasília as an opportunity to prove its mettle as a high-profile mediator, Brazil may now run the risk of being pulled into isolation. Amorim is right when he points out that sanctions are more likely to hurt Iran’s already battered population. He also argues that driving Iran into further isolation is unlikely to solve the nuclear squabble. Yet, he fails offer a clear alternative, and there is a danger that other nations come to regard Brazil as a notorious nay-sayer who blocks everything out of principle.  Also, supporting Iran may become a liability at home in Brazil, where women’s rights are cherished, and where government violence against protesters in Iran is harshly criticized. If Armorim’s call for further dialogue is to be taken seriously, Brazil must not only maintain cordial ties with Iran, but also offer constructive criticism and clearly communicate to Iran that it must do its part to solve the stand-off. It remains unclear whether President Lula has, at any point during his conversations with Iran’s Ahmadinejad, asked how Iran aims to do its part to reduce tensions.

Brazil could still emerge as the great winner of the situation if it finds a way to bring Iran and the West to the table. However, if Brazil holds on to its current stance for too long,  and misses the opportunity to reverse its policy in the face of an Iran determined to acquire nuclear weapons,  Brazil’s carefully accumulated “diplomatic GDP” will melt away, casting a shadow on a rising star on the international stage.

São Paulo’s state governor, probably the presidential candidate most able to push through necessary reform in Brazil, must finally start campaigning – if he doesn’t, the race will be lost before it has begun.

In Brazil, they say, things only get going after the Carnival. Maybe this is why José Serra, São Paulo’s  state governor, has so far refused to get on the campaign trail. While President Lula has long ago  switched into campaign mode, aiming to project his own dreamlike popularity on his chosen heiress, the much less charismatic and less known chief of staff Dilma Rousseff, José Serra continues to avoid campaign talk. “I am here as governor, and I don’t talk about [presidential] politics”, Serra announced at a recent press conference after journalists had inquired about his melting lead in the polls.

A loss of leadership in the opinion polls, however, is an  issue Serra cannot afford to ignore. Rather than mere reflections of voters’ views, opinion polls play a key role in the complex horse-trading and coalition-building that takes place before the elections. Unless Serra can project himself as a strong candidate and potential winner of this October’s elections, his chances to pull smaller king-making parties on his side are bleak.

While Serra would probably still win if elections were held today, he is up against an experienced campaigner who has participated as a major actor in every presidential contest since 1989. Lula himself is not be the candidate, but he is so popular that he may single-handedly carry Ms. Rousseff, his protegé, across the finish-line.

To run or not to run?

Such a scenario is not unheard of in Brazilian politics- in 1991, for example, São Paulo’s governor Orestes Quércia successfully pushed his heir, Luiz Antonio Fleury, into office. Insiders say that, aside from high-profile international trips, Lula will practically leave governing entirely to his aides during the final months of the presidency in order to promote Ms. Rousseff. Serra, if officially chosen as candidate, needs to resign as governor, which would give him all the time he needs to travel the country. But he can in no way match the star power Lula projects. Paradoxically, Lula’s highly effective predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is today seen in a critical light by most Brazilians, and he will be of no help during Serra’s campaign.

Given the urgency, why does Serra hesitate? While he correctly argues that he still has lots of work to do as governor, his strange reluctance to openly speak about his presidential ambitions may more simple reasons:  Some analysts wonder whether he really wants to run for President at all. His reelection as São Paulo’s state governor seems assured, and at 67, he may ask himself whether he should once more take on the pains of running for President after losing to Lula in 2002- especially given that he may very well lose to a Lula-powered Dilma Rousseff. If rumors are correct that Henrique Meirelles, Brazil’s popular Central Banker, is ready to run as Dilma’s VP, the Workers’ Party’s Lula-Dilma-Meirelles trirumvirate may prove invincible.

Serra’s dithering does not only hurt himself, but the PSDB’s chances to win the election. The party’s other contender, Aécio Neves, governor of Minas Gerais, is talented but relatively unknown on the national level, and his chances to beat Dilma are even lower. If he ran, he’d need every minute to assemble a campaign team and catch up with the Lula-Dilma campaign machine. If Serra decides to run now, he stands a good chance of becoming Brazil’s 36th President. Yet, every additional day Serra continues to remain quiet, his chances melt away. As The Economist has rightly pointed out, Serra may well become the best President Brazil has never had.

While it is difficult to know what exactly will happen in international politics in 2010,  we can predict what the key issues are that will shape global politics over the coming year- i.e., where to look for the important stuff. There is, of course, always the chance of unforeseen events.  Who would have predicted a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008? And who foresaw that severe post-election violence would shake Iran in 2009? Casting doubts about the utility of this exercise aside, I present my guesses about the ten issues to watch in international politics in 2010:

10. Presidential elections in Brazil

October 3, 2010: José Serra or Dilma Rousseff? The candidates have a lot in common: They largely agree on economic policy. They are both surprisingly uncharismatic, but quite competent and easy to underestimate. Ms. Rousseff, Lula’s chosen heiress, is more likely to continue Lula’s South-South diplomacy that aimed to position Brazil as the “Leader of the South”. Serra, on the other hand, would realign Brazil more with the United States and Europe, yet maintaining ties to other emerging powers. Under Serra, Iran’s Ahmadinejad will have to skip Brasília on his next visit to South America, and relations to Venezuela’s Chavez are likely to turn sour. Neither Serra nor Rousseff will be able to achieve Lula’s global stardom. Nonetheless, Brazil is a force to reckon with: Home to the world’s largest carbon sink, the Amazon, Brazil’s stance on climate change will be crucial, and only Brazil is able to salvage democracy in an increasingly divided South America.

9. Sino-Indian relations

The pecking order in Asia remains to be defined. While none of the big players (China, Japan, India and Russia) will be able to dominate, relations between China and India, the two most populous nations on the planet, deserve special attention. Both nations’ economic future seems very bright, and in theory they should work together towards a stable and prosperous Asia. Yet, relations between the two nuclear powers have been rocky, and they include several armed conflicts, most importantly the War of 1962, when the Chinese invaded a disputed border territory, suprising peace-loving Nehru. India continues to provide asylum to China’s nemesis, the Dalai Lama, and the border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh is far from resolved and keeps infuriating policy makers on both sides. The relations between China and India define the geopolitical climate in Asia.

8. The EU after Lisbon

Who is Herman van Rompuy? Few people really know. It is equally unknown what Europe’s governments will allow him to do. Will he be able to shape the EU’s foreign policy, or will be fulfil mere representative functions? One should not judge prematurely, but imagining van Rompuy at the G3 meeting with Obama and Jintao certainly seems unlikely. In any case, the EU’s ability to influence others on the international stage will depend on its willingness to find together, create a coherent foreign policy, and empower the first President of the European Council. 2010 will show if the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s still dismal international stature.

7. US-Chinese relations

One of the lessons Copenhagen has taught us  is that unless the United States and China agree, we are stuck. We are heading towards multipolarity, but US-Chinese relations remain a key barometer in international relations. 2010 will be particularly interesting as the two face very distinct economic realities: China is set to continue its growth story, while the US is still recovering. Economic relations between the two are so important that one cannot live without the other- and this is one of the major reasons to be hopeful about cordial US-Chinese relations in 2010.

6. The US economy

Despite all the hype about a Post-American World (which is also a terrific book by Fareed Zakaria), the United States remains the most important economy by far. While the BRIC countries are on their way to decouple from the West, the United States ability to recover economically will determine how quickly the global economy can leave the most severe crisis since the Great Depression behind. The speed of economic recovery in 2010 will also undoubtedly impact whether President Obama can continue to govern with a majority in both houses.

5. Muslims in Europe

The Swiss’ decision to ban the construction of minarets is by no means an outlier. Rather, it represents the struggle many European societies, such as Germany and France, face to reconcile the presence of Muslim immigrants with their national identities. The outcome of this struggle does not only matter for Europe. Rather, it helps define the way the West relates to the Muslim World on a global scale, as Europe is one of the regions where Christianity and Islam rub shoulders most frequently. A failure to successfully integrate Muslims in Europe will not only tarnish relations with Turkey, but also squander the great chance Europe has to invalidate Samuel Huntington’s theory of a clash of civilizations.

4. The war in Afghanistan

If history is any guide, 2010 will be the bloodiest year of the Afghanistan War since the US-led invasion eight years ago. While the majority of the US population supports the surge, patience can be expected to be short-lived, and the generals face great pressure to deliver results. More casualties will enlarge the group of those who call for NATO to retreat from Central Asia. Several governments, such as in Germany and the United Kingdom, will face growing domestic pressure to let the US finish the job on its own. As Yemen has turned into the new safe haven for Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan may increasingly look like the wrong place to fight terrorism. The key question will be whether the higher US military presence can quell the insurgency, whether talking to the moderate Taliban will result in anything, and whether President Karzai can miraculously help stabilize the country.

3. Global Governance Reform

The rise of emerging powers such as China, Brazil and India amplifies our current global governance structure’s lack of legitimacy and inadequacy to effectively deal with our most pressing problems. While the G8 seems outdated, it remains unclear whether the G20 will be able to take meaningful decisions. Copenhagen has vividly shown that we are in dire need of new forms of global governance. In addition, we face a growing array of problems, such as public health, international banking regulation, climate change and terrorism, that can impossibly be solved by a small number of established powers. After countless and often fruitless global summits in 2009, heads of government have to deliver in 2010. The G20 summit in Korea and the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Mexico City offer opportunities to make up for the failures of 2009.

2. Domestic politics in Iran and Iranian foreign policy

Situated between three of the most unstable countries in the world, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran’s strategic importance cannot be overestimated. Since the rigged elections in 2009, the government faces domestic political turmoil. 2010 is likely to be decisive in this context. There are roughly three options: First, the government regains control and crushes the protesters. Second, the government makes major concessions to the opposition and allows fresh elections. Finally, the country may enter a permanent and profound political crisis which may result in serious armed conflict, making the country’s destiny highly unpredictable.  Iran’s domestic politics are strongly intertwined with its foreign policy, and there is a danger that a domestically cornered Ahmadinjad turns more aggressive and less likely to engage with the West. Once Iran acquires nuclear arms, the future of the NPT will look uncertain. A military strike either by Israel or the United States is, while probably useless, likely to have dramatic consequences, and Iran, which has not attacked another country in modern history, may retaliate.

1. The civil war in Pakistan

Why is Pakistan in the top spot? The possibility of a failed state in Pakistan keeps foreign policy makers across the world awake at night, and they have every reason to do so. More than Iran, North Korea or even a Taliban-led Afghanistan,  nuclear-armed radical Islamists in Islamabad would have the ability to significantly disrupt global political stability and plunge South Asia into chaos. Furthermore, terrorists could detonate nuclear bombs in India, Europe or the United States. While the Pakistani army seems to have made progress in the war against radical Islamists along the border with Afghanistan, it remains far from clear whether the current government can keep Pakistan, a country where Osama bin Laden remains more popular than Barack Obama, from imploding. Furthermore, the US army, already highly active on Pakistani soil with its drone attacks (pictured above), is on a slippery slope and may soon see itself pulled into Waziristan.

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=310846&usrsess=1

December 16, 2009

by Oliver Stuenkel

When India’s Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his Brazilian counterpart Guido Mantega announced, during the IMF’s annual meeting in Istanbul in October, that India and Brazil would both lend $ 10 billion to the International Monetary Fund, it symbolised, more than anything, both countries’ transition from developing country to global player. Brazilian and Indian policymakers now face the difficult task of leading their respective societies through a conflict of identities that pits traditions, loyalties and long held beliefs against a new and unfamiliar set of challenges their new status brings with it.
Over the past decades, the IMF’s involvement has left more scars on Brazil and India’s identity than many Western analysts like to believe, and a dependency and perceived victimisation by the IMF has played an important role in shaping the way Brazil and India perceive themselves. The fund has also helped sustain an anti-Western, third worldish discourse among policy makers in both countries.

Power houses
NOW, the tables have turned: both countries have repaid their debt and become economic power houses, and their new status as lenders to the IMF puts them in a bind: Governments can no longer blame the evil imperialist institutions for domestic ills. But worse still, as their voting share in the fund increases, Brazil and India have to assume responsibility, and they suddenly find themselves in the shoes of the troublesome meddlers they so despised in the past. How do Brazil and India, having only recently emerged from IMF tutelage, deal with their past as developing countries, now that they themselves intervene, through the IMF, in poor countries?
Given the trauma both countries have suffered during IMF tutelage (Joseph Stiglitz once remarked that India’s agreement with the IMF in the early nineties was comparable to the surrender of the Maharajas to the British), it seems quite surprising that the Singh and Lula governments were so keen to embrace these very institutions in the first place. After years of what even moderate politicians have called “humiliating” interaction with the fund, engaging with it as a lender is a sign of mature and rational policy making. Brazil and India have both realised that the world needs a credible lender of last resort, and that rather than shunning the fund, it is Brazil and India’s responsibility to make the IMF more legitimate and effective. They thus prove to be much more serious and sophisticated actors than the rabble rousers in Venezuela and Iran, who give little thought to the system-wide implications of their policies.
This change of heart is particularly remarkable considering that Lula’s entire ideology is based on the confrontation between rich and poor, both domestically and on the international level. Only ten years ago, lending money to the IMF would have been considered treason among members of Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT).

This is not to say, however, that Brazil and India will uncritically assume a Western, pro-IMF mindset, nor does it mean that old identities are given up easily. Policies may change quickly, but traditions, deeply held convictions and loyalties linger. Brazil and India are, therefore, in the delicate position of lending money to the IMF, while holding on to memories of their struggle against the fund’s legendary arrogance.
President Lula embodies this dilemma better than anyone. Only days after announcing the historic move of lending money to the IMF, Lula talked himself into a rage during a rally, bawling that “those institutions (…) knew everything when we had a crisis, but they don’t know anything when the crisis is happening over there (in the rich world)”. Or at least, he speculated, “it is not permitted to give their advice in such an arrogant manner”. In India, this almost schizophrenic mindset manifests itself in an increasingly realist, big power strategy (which includes considerable meddling in Afghanistan), sprinkled with an archaic, Nehruvian- idealist rhetoric (according to which promoting democracy abroad is out of the question).
As both countries continue to grow, their identity will most likely be neither that of a developing country, nor that of today’s developed countries. Yet, it would be too easy to simply predict that Brazil and India will create their own, unique category. They will be, like all others, subject to the same rules of nature. If Brazil and India want to play in the league of big powers, they will have to, at times, step on the smaller countries’ toes. “If you’re in a bathtub with an elephant”, Harvard’s Graham Allison once said, “it may be uncomfortable, no matter how nice the elephant tries to be”. Taking a position in Afghanistan, the Middle East, or simply in the IMF’s Board of Directors about a controversial loan will cause some smaller players to criticise Brazil and India in the same way Brazil and India once denounced the United States. This transformation process will require vision, the willingness to move out of the comfort zone, and, above all, courage to be disloyal to long-held convictions.
The writer is a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo and a Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

During the G8 summit in Italy in July, President Obama and Brazil’s President Lula once again demonstrated their mutual admiration. Earlier this year, when asked about Lula during the G20 summit in London, Obama said he “loved this guy,” calling him “the most popular politician in the world.” And over the past months, rumors spread among Brazil’s political elite that President Obama had tapped Brazil’s President Lula to head the World Bank in 2011. Picking Brazil’s outgoing President, whose term ends next year, seems like an attractive and risk-free chance for Mr. Obama to play the role of visionary reformer, and break with the increasingly anachronistic tradition of appointing only US citizens for the job of World Bank Chief.

Yet, the US President should look again. Lula may be a skilled diplomat and immensely popular both at home and abroad. A closer look, however, reveals that Lula fails to represent the key values the World Bank aims to project: democracy and human rights. While the World Bank’s stated objective is poverty reduction, its legitimacy is based on the commitment to human rights and democratic governance. Lula is the wrong choice for World Bank President.

True, there are points in Lula’s favor. As a policy-maker he has been effective. He genuinely cares about development and poverty reduction: having grown up in poverty himself, Lula expanded Bolsa Familia, a highly effective anti-poverty program which has won praise internationally. Lula has also frequently traveled to Africa and made economic development an important part of his foreign policy.

There are political arguments in his favor as well. Lula comes from a region where respect for the World Bank is low. In Latin America, the Bank is primarily associated with the Washington Consensus, a botched attempt to spur economic development by radical economic liberalization. Lula’s appointment would appeal to constituencies across the continent and mend the rift between the developing and developed world. And Lula is a great communicator who, as figurehead and symbol rather than as day-to-day manager of the Bank, could help humanize an institution that at times has seemed overly aloof from the problems on the ground.  And, from a practical point of view, Democrats in the US Congress would be likely to accept Lula, given his past as a union leader.

Yet, despite all this, a Lula candidacy has major flaws—and it would set an appalling precedent for international organizations in general.

The truth is that Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula has been opportunistic, short-term, and void of principles. While condemning “white, blue-eyed” bankers for the global financial crisis, Lula has failed to criticize human rights abuses in Cuba and an increasingly authoritarian Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. During a recent visit to Kazakhstan, another authoritarian regime, Lula affirmed that there was “no fraud in the Iranian election,” congratulating President Ahmadinejad on his victory. Rather than helping Colombia’s democratically elected President Uribe in his fight against a leftist insurgency, Lula remained neutral and even temporarily allowed the FARC guerillas to enter Brazilian territory to evade Colombia’s army. And in 2005, Brazilian diplomats visited Khartoum and promised not to condemn Sudan for its genocide as long as Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir supported Brazil’s in its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Always quick to find fault with “evil Western institutions” and “imperialists”, Lula gets along with third world dictators so well that one may ask whether he would have the courage to openly criticize them as World Bank President. His decision to open a Brazilian embassy in North Korea shortly after Kim Jong Il’s missile testing has raised further doubts about Lula’s aptitude. His high domestic approval ratings are not necessarily a sign of good policy, but rather of his reluctance to push his constituents out of their comfort zone and tackle Brazil’s most serious problems, such as social security and tax reform. Western leaders have a romanticized vision of Lula. The fact that Western leaders ignore Lula’s diatribes shows how irrelevant he has become.

So who should Mr. Obama appoint to head the World Bank? If Mr. Obama truly wants to modernize the Bank, he must appoint no-one. Instead, he needs to create a democratic decision making process to elect somebody who has exercised exceptional leadership.

For example, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is not only committed to democracy and human rights, but he is also the architect of India’s economic growth story. He would be well-prepared to lead the Bank. The handshake agreement that gave the United States the right to appoint the World Bank chief is a remnant of a past era. It undermines the World Bank’s legitimacy where it matters most: in the poor countries. It is in America’s best interest to disassociate itself from the World Bank President selection process.

As its name suggests, the World Bank aspires to be a global institution, and the fight against poverty requires a universal effort. But as long as the United States dominates the World Bank, developing countries will question its sincerity and legitimacy, severely weakening the Bank’s impact. The selection process must therefore be transparent and not based on nationality, but on merit. Rather than appointing Lula, Mr. Obama needs to democratize the World Bank to give it the strength to help lift the bottom billion out of poverty.