São Paulo’s state governor, probably the presidential candidate most able to push through necessary reform in Brazil, must finally start campaigning – if he doesn’t, the race will be lost before it has begun.

In Brazil, they say, things only get going after the Carnival. Maybe this is why José Serra, São Paulo’s  state governor, has so far refused to get on the campaign trail. While President Lula has long ago  switched into campaign mode, aiming to project his own dreamlike popularity on his chosen heiress, the much less charismatic and less known chief of staff Dilma Rousseff, José Serra continues to avoid campaign talk. “I am here as governor, and I don’t talk about [presidential] politics”, Serra announced at a recent press conference after journalists had inquired about his melting lead in the polls.

A loss of leadership in the opinion polls, however, is an  issue Serra cannot afford to ignore. Rather than mere reflections of voters’ views, opinion polls play a key role in the complex horse-trading and coalition-building that takes place before the elections. Unless Serra can project himself as a strong candidate and potential winner of this October’s elections, his chances to pull smaller king-making parties on his side are bleak.

While Serra would probably still win if elections were held today, he is up against an experienced campaigner who has participated as a major actor in every presidential contest since 1989. Lula himself is not be the candidate, but he is so popular that he may single-handedly carry Ms. Rousseff, his protegé, across the finish-line.

To run or not to run?

Such a scenario is not unheard of in Brazilian politics- in 1991, for example, São Paulo’s governor Orestes Quércia successfully pushed his heir, Luiz Antonio Fleury, into office. Insiders say that, aside from high-profile international trips, Lula will practically leave governing entirely to his aides during the final months of the presidency in order to promote Ms. Rousseff. Serra, if officially chosen as candidate, needs to resign as governor, which would give him all the time he needs to travel the country. But he can in no way match the star power Lula projects. Paradoxically, Lula’s highly effective predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is today seen in a critical light by most Brazilians, and he will be of no help during Serra’s campaign.

Given the urgency, why does Serra hesitate? While he correctly argues that he still has lots of work to do as governor, his strange reluctance to openly speak about his presidential ambitions may more simple reasons:  Some analysts wonder whether he really wants to run for President at all. His reelection as São Paulo’s state governor seems assured, and at 67, he may ask himself whether he should once more take on the pains of running for President after losing to Lula in 2002- especially given that he may very well lose to a Lula-powered Dilma Rousseff. If rumors are correct that Henrique Meirelles, Brazil’s popular Central Banker, is ready to run as Dilma’s VP, the Workers’ Party’s Lula-Dilma-Meirelles trirumvirate may prove invincible.

Serra’s dithering does not only hurt himself, but the PSDB’s chances to win the election. The party’s other contender, Aécio Neves, governor of Minas Gerais, is talented but relatively unknown on the national level, and his chances to beat Dilma are even lower. If he ran, he’d need every minute to assemble a campaign team and catch up with the Lula-Dilma campaign machine. If Serra decides to run now, he stands a good chance of becoming Brazil’s 36th President. Yet, every additional day Serra continues to remain quiet, his chances melt away. As The Economist has rightly pointed out, Serra may well become the best President Brazil has never had.

While it is difficult to know what exactly will happen in international politics in 2010,  we can predict what the key issues are that will shape global politics over the coming year- i.e., where to look for the important stuff. There is, of course, always the chance of unforeseen events.  Who would have predicted a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008? And who foresaw that severe post-election violence would shake Iran in 2009? Casting doubts about the utility of this exercise aside, I present my guesses about the ten issues to watch in international politics in 2010:

10. Presidential elections in Brazil

October 3, 2010: José Serra or Dilma Rousseff? The candidates have a lot in common: They largely agree on economic policy. They are both surprisingly uncharismatic, but quite competent and easy to underestimate. Ms. Rousseff, Lula’s chosen heiress, is more likely to continue Lula’s South-South diplomacy that aimed to position Brazil as the “Leader of the South”. Serra, on the other hand, would realign Brazil more with the United States and Europe, yet maintaining ties to other emerging powers. Under Serra, Iran’s Ahmadinejad will have to skip Brasília on his next visit to South America, and relations to Venezuela’s Chavez are likely to turn sour. Neither Serra nor Rousseff will be able to achieve Lula’s global stardom. Nonetheless, Brazil is a force to reckon with: Home to the world’s largest carbon sink, the Amazon, Brazil’s stance on climate change will be crucial, and only Brazil is able to salvage democracy in an increasingly divided South America.

9. Sino-Indian relations

The pecking order in Asia remains to be defined. While none of the big players (China, Japan, India and Russia) will be able to dominate, relations between China and India, the two most populous nations on the planet, deserve special attention. Both nations’ economic future seems very bright, and in theory they should work together towards a stable and prosperous Asia. Yet, relations between the two nuclear powers have been rocky, and they include several armed conflicts, most importantly the War of 1962, when the Chinese invaded a disputed border territory, suprising peace-loving Nehru. India continues to provide asylum to China’s nemesis, the Dalai Lama, and the border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh is far from resolved and keeps infuriating policy makers on both sides. The relations between China and India define the geopolitical climate in Asia.

8. The EU after Lisbon

Who is Herman van Rompuy? Few people really know. It is equally unknown what Europe’s governments will allow him to do. Will he be able to shape the EU’s foreign policy, or will be fulfil mere representative functions? One should not judge prematurely, but imagining van Rompuy at the G3 meeting with Obama and Jintao certainly seems unlikely. In any case, the EU’s ability to influence others on the international stage will depend on its willingness to find together, create a coherent foreign policy, and empower the first President of the European Council. 2010 will show if the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s still dismal international stature.

7. US-Chinese relations

One of the lessons Copenhagen has taught us  is that unless the United States and China agree, we are stuck. We are heading towards multipolarity, but US-Chinese relations remain a key barometer in international relations. 2010 will be particularly interesting as the two face very distinct economic realities: China is set to continue its growth story, while the US is still recovering. Economic relations between the two are so important that one cannot live without the other- and this is one of the major reasons to be hopeful about cordial US-Chinese relations in 2010.

6. The US economy

Despite all the hype about a Post-American World (which is also a terrific book by Fareed Zakaria), the United States remains the most important economy by far. While the BRIC countries are on their way to decouple from the West, the United States ability to recover economically will determine how quickly the global economy can leave the most severe crisis since the Great Depression behind. The speed of economic recovery in 2010 will also undoubtedly impact whether President Obama can continue to govern with a majority in both houses.

5. Muslims in Europe

The Swiss’ decision to ban the construction of minarets is by no means an outlier. Rather, it represents the struggle many European societies, such as Germany and France, face to reconcile the presence of Muslim immigrants with their national identities. The outcome of this struggle does not only matter for Europe. Rather, it helps define the way the West relates to the Muslim World on a global scale, as Europe is one of the regions where Christianity and Islam rub shoulders most frequently. A failure to successfully integrate Muslims in Europe will not only tarnish relations with Turkey, but also squander the great chance Europe has to invalidate Samuel Huntington’s theory of a clash of civilizations.

4. The war in Afghanistan

If history is any guide, 2010 will be the bloodiest year of the Afghanistan War since the US-led invasion eight years ago. While the majority of the US population supports the surge, patience can be expected to be short-lived, and the generals face great pressure to deliver results. More casualties will enlarge the group of those who call for NATO to retreat from Central Asia. Several governments, such as in Germany and the United Kingdom, will face growing domestic pressure to let the US finish the job on its own. As Yemen has turned into the new safe haven for Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan may increasingly look like the wrong place to fight terrorism. The key question will be whether the higher US military presence can quell the insurgency, whether talking to the moderate Taliban will result in anything, and whether President Karzai can miraculously help stabilize the country.

3. Global Governance Reform

The rise of emerging powers such as China, Brazil and India amplifies our current global governance structure’s lack of legitimacy and inadequacy to effectively deal with our most pressing problems. While the G8 seems outdated, it remains unclear whether the G20 will be able to take meaningful decisions. Copenhagen has vividly shown that we are in dire need of new forms of global governance. In addition, we face a growing array of problems, such as public health, international banking regulation, climate change and terrorism, that can impossibly be solved by a small number of established powers. After countless and often fruitless global summits in 2009, heads of government have to deliver in 2010. The G20 summit in Korea and the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Mexico City offer opportunities to make up for the failures of 2009.

2. Domestic politics in Iran and Iranian foreign policy

Situated between three of the most unstable countries in the world, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran’s strategic importance cannot be overestimated. Since the rigged elections in 2009, the government faces domestic political turmoil. 2010 is likely to be decisive in this context. There are roughly three options: First, the government regains control and crushes the protesters. Second, the government makes major concessions to the opposition and allows fresh elections. Finally, the country may enter a permanent and profound political crisis which may result in serious armed conflict, making the country’s destiny highly unpredictable.  Iran’s domestic politics are strongly intertwined with its foreign policy, and there is a danger that a domestically cornered Ahmadinjad turns more aggressive and less likely to engage with the West. Once Iran acquires nuclear arms, the future of the NPT will look uncertain. A military strike either by Israel or the United States is, while probably useless, likely to have dramatic consequences, and Iran, which has not attacked another country in modern history, may retaliate.

1. The civil war in Pakistan

Why is Pakistan in the top spot? The possibility of a failed state in Pakistan keeps foreign policy makers across the world awake at night, and they have every reason to do so. More than Iran, North Korea or even a Taliban-led Afghanistan,  nuclear-armed radical Islamists in Islamabad would have the ability to significantly disrupt global political stability and plunge South Asia into chaos. Furthermore, terrorists could detonate nuclear bombs in India, Europe or the United States. While the Pakistani army seems to have made progress in the war against radical Islamists along the border with Afghanistan, it remains far from clear whether the current government can keep Pakistan, a country where Osama bin Laden remains more popular than Barack Obama, from imploding. Furthermore, the US army, already highly active on Pakistani soil with its drone attacks (pictured above), is on a slippery slope and may soon see itself pulled into Waziristan.

http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=310846&usrsess=1

December 16, 2009

by Oliver Stuenkel

When India’s Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his Brazilian counterpart Guido Mantega announced, during the IMF’s annual meeting in Istanbul in October, that India and Brazil would both lend $ 10 billion to the International Monetary Fund, it symbolised, more than anything, both countries’ transition from developing country to global player. Brazilian and Indian policymakers now face the difficult task of leading their respective societies through a conflict of identities that pits traditions, loyalties and long held beliefs against a new and unfamiliar set of challenges their new status brings with it.
Over the past decades, the IMF’s involvement has left more scars on Brazil and India’s identity than many Western analysts like to believe, and a dependency and perceived victimisation by the IMF has played an important role in shaping the way Brazil and India perceive themselves. The fund has also helped sustain an anti-Western, third worldish discourse among policy makers in both countries.

Power houses
NOW, the tables have turned: both countries have repaid their debt and become economic power houses, and their new status as lenders to the IMF puts them in a bind: Governments can no longer blame the evil imperialist institutions for domestic ills. But worse still, as their voting share in the fund increases, Brazil and India have to assume responsibility, and they suddenly find themselves in the shoes of the troublesome meddlers they so despised in the past. How do Brazil and India, having only recently emerged from IMF tutelage, deal with their past as developing countries, now that they themselves intervene, through the IMF, in poor countries?
Given the trauma both countries have suffered during IMF tutelage (Joseph Stiglitz once remarked that India’s agreement with the IMF in the early nineties was comparable to the surrender of the Maharajas to the British), it seems quite surprising that the Singh and Lula governments were so keen to embrace these very institutions in the first place. After years of what even moderate politicians have called “humiliating” interaction with the fund, engaging with it as a lender is a sign of mature and rational policy making. Brazil and India have both realised that the world needs a credible lender of last resort, and that rather than shunning the fund, it is Brazil and India’s responsibility to make the IMF more legitimate and effective. They thus prove to be much more serious and sophisticated actors than the rabble rousers in Venezuela and Iran, who give little thought to the system-wide implications of their policies.
This change of heart is particularly remarkable considering that Lula’s entire ideology is based on the confrontation between rich and poor, both domestically and on the international level. Only ten years ago, lending money to the IMF would have been considered treason among members of Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT).

This is not to say, however, that Brazil and India will uncritically assume a Western, pro-IMF mindset, nor does it mean that old identities are given up easily. Policies may change quickly, but traditions, deeply held convictions and loyalties linger. Brazil and India are, therefore, in the delicate position of lending money to the IMF, while holding on to memories of their struggle against the fund’s legendary arrogance.
President Lula embodies this dilemma better than anyone. Only days after announcing the historic move of lending money to the IMF, Lula talked himself into a rage during a rally, bawling that “those institutions (…) knew everything when we had a crisis, but they don’t know anything when the crisis is happening over there (in the rich world)”. Or at least, he speculated, “it is not permitted to give their advice in such an arrogant manner”. In India, this almost schizophrenic mindset manifests itself in an increasingly realist, big power strategy (which includes considerable meddling in Afghanistan), sprinkled with an archaic, Nehruvian- idealist rhetoric (according to which promoting democracy abroad is out of the question).
As both countries continue to grow, their identity will most likely be neither that of a developing country, nor that of today’s developed countries. Yet, it would be too easy to simply predict that Brazil and India will create their own, unique category. They will be, like all others, subject to the same rules of nature. If Brazil and India want to play in the league of big powers, they will have to, at times, step on the smaller countries’ toes. “If you’re in a bathtub with an elephant”, Harvard’s Graham Allison once said, “it may be uncomfortable, no matter how nice the elephant tries to be”. Taking a position in Afghanistan, the Middle East, or simply in the IMF’s Board of Directors about a controversial loan will cause some smaller players to criticise Brazil and India in the same way Brazil and India once denounced the United States. This transformation process will require vision, the willingness to move out of the comfort zone, and, above all, courage to be disloyal to long-held convictions.
The writer is a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the University of São Paulo and a Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin.

During the G8 summit in Italy in July, President Obama and Brazil’s President Lula once again demonstrated their mutual admiration. Earlier this year, when asked about Lula during the G20 summit in London, Obama said he “loved this guy,” calling him “the most popular politician in the world.” And over the past months, rumors spread among Brazil’s political elite that President Obama had tapped Brazil’s President Lula to head the World Bank in 2011. Picking Brazil’s outgoing President, whose term ends next year, seems like an attractive and risk-free chance for Mr. Obama to play the role of visionary reformer, and break with the increasingly anachronistic tradition of appointing only US citizens for the job of World Bank Chief.

Yet, the US President should look again. Lula may be a skilled diplomat and immensely popular both at home and abroad. A closer look, however, reveals that Lula fails to represent the key values the World Bank aims to project: democracy and human rights. While the World Bank’s stated objective is poverty reduction, its legitimacy is based on the commitment to human rights and democratic governance. Lula is the wrong choice for World Bank President.

True, there are points in Lula’s favor. As a policy-maker he has been effective. He genuinely cares about development and poverty reduction: having grown up in poverty himself, Lula expanded Bolsa Familia, a highly effective anti-poverty program which has won praise internationally. Lula has also frequently traveled to Africa and made economic development an important part of his foreign policy.

There are political arguments in his favor as well. Lula comes from a region where respect for the World Bank is low. In Latin America, the Bank is primarily associated with the Washington Consensus, a botched attempt to spur economic development by radical economic liberalization. Lula’s appointment would appeal to constituencies across the continent and mend the rift between the developing and developed world. And Lula is a great communicator who, as figurehead and symbol rather than as day-to-day manager of the Bank, could help humanize an institution that at times has seemed overly aloof from the problems on the ground.  And, from a practical point of view, Democrats in the US Congress would be likely to accept Lula, given his past as a union leader.

Yet, despite all this, a Lula candidacy has major flaws—and it would set an appalling precedent for international organizations in general.

The truth is that Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula has been opportunistic, short-term, and void of principles. While condemning “white, blue-eyed” bankers for the global financial crisis, Lula has failed to criticize human rights abuses in Cuba and an increasingly authoritarian Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. During a recent visit to Kazakhstan, another authoritarian regime, Lula affirmed that there was “no fraud in the Iranian election,” congratulating President Ahmadinejad on his victory. Rather than helping Colombia’s democratically elected President Uribe in his fight against a leftist insurgency, Lula remained neutral and even temporarily allowed the FARC guerillas to enter Brazilian territory to evade Colombia’s army. And in 2005, Brazilian diplomats visited Khartoum and promised not to condemn Sudan for its genocide as long as Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir supported Brazil’s in its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Always quick to find fault with “evil Western institutions” and “imperialists”, Lula gets along with third world dictators so well that one may ask whether he would have the courage to openly criticize them as World Bank President. His decision to open a Brazilian embassy in North Korea shortly after Kim Jong Il’s missile testing has raised further doubts about Lula’s aptitude. His high domestic approval ratings are not necessarily a sign of good policy, but rather of his reluctance to push his constituents out of their comfort zone and tackle Brazil’s most serious problems, such as social security and tax reform. Western leaders have a romanticized vision of Lula. The fact that Western leaders ignore Lula’s diatribes shows how irrelevant he has become.

So who should Mr. Obama appoint to head the World Bank? If Mr. Obama truly wants to modernize the Bank, he must appoint no-one. Instead, he needs to create a democratic decision making process to elect somebody who has exercised exceptional leadership.

For example, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is not only committed to democracy and human rights, but he is also the architect of India’s economic growth story. He would be well-prepared to lead the Bank. The handshake agreement that gave the United States the right to appoint the World Bank chief is a remnant of a past era. It undermines the World Bank’s legitimacy where it matters most: in the poor countries. It is in America’s best interest to disassociate itself from the World Bank President selection process.

As its name suggests, the World Bank aspires to be a global institution, and the fight against poverty requires a universal effort. But as long as the United States dominates the World Bank, developing countries will question its sincerity and legitimacy, severely weakening the Bank’s impact. The selection process must therefore be transparent and not based on nationality, but on merit. Rather than appointing Lula, Mr. Obama needs to democratize the World Bank to give it the strength to help lift the bottom billion out of poverty.

Over the past years, the BRICs’ role in world affairs has been steadily increasing. Nowadays, global summits can no longer claim legitimacy and inclusiveness without inviting Brazil, Russia, India and China.

Yet, yesterday’s glittering FIFA’s World Cup Draw Ceremony reminded us that during the 2010’s Football World Cup- the Global Summit on Soccer (the “G32”) in South Africa, the world’s emerging powers will be, with the exception of Brazil, conspicuously absent. While the G20, the World Bank and the IMF attempt to become more representative, the World Cup’s inclusiveness is seems paltry in comparison: the 32 participating countries represent less than 25% of the world’s population, and only a little more than 50% of global GDP. In addition, there are large regions in the world where soccer plays no role at all: Roughly 1.5 billion South Asians have never seen their national teams participate in a World Cup, and there are few signs they ever will.
Russia, which has played many tournaments, came tantalizingly close to obtaining a spot in South Africa, but was eliminated by a hard-hitting Serbian squad last month. China’s hopes were dashed after losing to Iraq. Their failure can thus be attributed to bad luck. Brazil has always been a soccer superpower, long before receiving the BRIC label. India, on the other hand, is the most peculiar case by far, and its problems seem more complex. With 1.1 billion people, a growing middle class and strong British traditions, the country should have all the necessary ingredients to emerge as a soccer giant. Yet, several obstacles seem to make this scenario unlikely.

The first is cultural: Martial arts, chess and yoga listed among the most popular activities in ancient India. Prior to the arrival of the British, physical exercise was usually linked to religious rites.  While the British did introduce soccer in India (The first recorded game in India took place between ‘Calcutta Club of Civilians’ and ‘The Gentlemen of Barrackpore’ in 1854), they did more to promote cricket, an odd and for outsiders unintelligible sport that has gained preciously little support outside of the Commonwealth. Cricket has since become the most popular sport in India. The second reason has to do with bad governance. The government does virtually nothing to promote young talents, the sports infrastructure is abysmal, and consequently India is probably the least represented country (per capita) not only during the Soccer World Cup, but also during both Winter and Summer Olympics.

Can India hope to participate in a World Cup soon, or is Indian soccer condemned to remain on the sidelines? There are several signs that a change may be underway. Soccer is surprisingly popular in several Indian states, such as West Bengal, Goa and Kerala. The Indian team qualified for the 1950 World Cup finals in Brazil, but they were tragically excluded from the tournament because Indians still played barefoot at the time. In 2006, India signed an accord with Brazil which involves knowledge sharing and having Brazilian coaches help their Indian counterparts modernize the game. In addition, the All India Football Federation (AIFF) seems to get its act together. Two years ago, the I-League was founded. It has been expanding ever since, currently featuring 14 clubs. Famous European clubs have also begun to eye the Indian market. There are an estimated 160 million soccer fans in India, many of them willing and able to pay for jerseys, training and tickets. Liverpool, a British club, is setting up a center of excellence in Pune, South of Mumbai. Bayern Munich is working with the West Bengal government to set up an academy in Burdwan.

India may well have a long way to go, and it certainly has more pressing issues to worry about than its small number of soccer fields. Yet, hosting a World Cup- in 2030, for example- would surely help move the world’s most popular sport closer to the Indians’ hearts.

Interview mit dem Politikwissenschaftler Oliver Stuenkel (23.11.2009)

(in German)

Link

Brazil’s President Lula is a lucky man. With an approval rating north of 80% in his seventh year in office and a booming economy, Lula has the luxury to gloss over unpopular but necessary projects such as tax and pension reform, and to focus on the icing on the cake for the remainder of his presidency, which ends in December 2010. Brazil’s President tours the country, inaugurates projects, promotes his chief of staff and chosen heiress, Dilma Rousseff, and seeks a more important role for Brazil in the world.

Brazil now lends money to the IMF, pushes for more voting power in the World Bank, and attempts to assume regional leadership in South America. Lula also seeks to institutionalize South-South relations, for example through IBSA and the BRIC summit. Finally, Brazil aims to play an leading role in the G20 and hopes to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council soon.

What’s next? Looking at Lula’s recent guest list, it seems as if he is hoping to play a leading role in the Middle East Peace Process. Within a span of 10 days, Shimon Peres (13/11), Mahmoud Abbas (20/11) and Mahmound Ahmadinejad (23/11) visited Brasília- too close together to be a coincidence. Can Lula convince them to sit down and talk? At a first glance, Brazil’s chance to get the conversation started seems very small. Despite the recent hype, Brazil is still a second-class player in geopolitics. Making up less than 2% of global GDP, it has a small military force, and it is the only BRIC member that does not possess nuclear arms.

A more careful analysis, however, shows that Brazil may indeed have a shot at helping the get the conversation started. It is one of the few countries on earth that is on good terms with Israel, Palestine and Iran. Brazil’s lack of strategic interest in the Middle East may help it be more objective, and reduce suspicions by any party involved that Brazil has a hidden agenda. While 5% of Brazilians are of Arab descent, they do not constitute a lobby that may influence Brazil’s impartiality. Neither do Brazil’s 100,000 Jews, some of which are prominent public intellectuals, have a strong lobby. Also, Brazil has distanced itself sufficiently from the United States, so it cannot be accused of being Obama’s agent, which would most likely antagonize Iran. Finally, Brazil’s President is a skilled diplomat who, despite regular gaffes, is known to get along with pretty much anyone at the same time. While Lula’s failure to condemn human rights abuses and rigged elections abroad is notorious, he may be just the right guy to get Iran and Israel sit around one table.

It is, after all, a risk-free strategy for Lula. Failure would be unlikely to affect his legacy. The conflict between Israel and Palestine highly complex, and it would be foolish for Lula to believe that he could single-handedly fix the Middle East. Yet, convincing Israeli, Palestinian and Iranian government officials to even sit down and discuss in Brasília would be quite a feat, and it would boost Brazil’s diplomatic GDP significantly and strengthen Brazil’s rightful quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Finally, Brazil’s insertion in the Middle East Conflict as a credible mediator would suit Lula’s personal ambition and bring him closer to the realization of his next objective: To succeed Ban-Ki moon as United Nations Secretary General. There may well be more luck for Lula in store.